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(Original Signature of Member)

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. _____

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. KUCINICH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on _____

RESOLUTION

Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United
States, for high crimes and misdemeanors.

1 *Resolved*, That Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of
2 the United States, is impeached for high crimes and mis-
3 demeanors, and that the following articles of impeachment
4 be exhibited to the United States Senate:

5 Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of
6 Representatives of the United States of America in the
7 name of itself and of the people of the United States of
8 America, against Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the



1 United States of America, in maintenance and support of
2 its impeachment against him for high crimes and mis-
3 demeanors.

4 **Article I**

5 In his conduct while Vice President of the United
6 States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitu-
7 tional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice Presi-
8 dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability,
9 preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
10 United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty
11 to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has pur-
12 posely manipulated the intelligence process to deceive the
13 citizens and Congress of the United States by fabricating
14 a threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to justify
15 the use of the United States Armed Forces against the
16 nation of Iraq in a manner damaging to our national secu-
17 rity interests, to wit:

18 (1) Despite all evidence to the contrary, the
19 Vice President actively and systematically sought to
20 deceive the citizens and Congress of the United
21 States about an alleged threat of Iraqi weapons of
22 mass destruction:

23 (A) "We know they have biological and
24 chemical weapons." March 17, 2002, Press
25 Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney and




1 His Highness Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa,
2 Crown Prince of Bahrain at Shaikh Hamad
3 Palace.

4 (B) "...and we know they are pursuing nu-
5 clear weapons." March 19, 2002, Press Brief-
6 ing by Vice President Dick Cheney and Israeli
7 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Jerusalem.

8 (C) "And he is actively pursuing nuclear
9 weapons at this time..." March 24, 2002, CNN
10 Late Edition interview with Vice President Che-
11 ney.

12 (D) "We know he's got chemicals and bio-
13 logical and we know he's working on nuclear."
14 May 19, 2002, NBC Meet the Press interview
15 with Vice President Cheney.

16 (E) "But we now know that Saddam has
17 resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weap-
18 ons... Simply stated, there is no doubt that Sad-
19 dam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruc-
20 tion. There is no doubt that he is amassing
21 them to use against our friends, against our al-
22 lies, and against us." August 26, 2002, Speech
23 of Vice President Cheney at VFW 103rd Na-
24 tional Convention.



1 (F) “Based on intelligence that’s becoming
2 available, some of it has been made public,
3 more of it hopefully will be, that he has indeed
4 stepped up his capacity to produce and deliver
5 biological weapons, that he has reconstituted
6 his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weap-
7 on, that there are efforts under way inside Iraq
8 to significantly expand his capability.” Sep-
9 tember 8, 2002 NBC Meet the Press interview
10 with Vice President Cheney.

11 (G) “He is, in fact, actively and aggres-
12 sively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.”
13 September 8, 2002 NBC Meet the Press inter-
14 view with Vice President Cheney.

15 (H) “And we believe he has, in fact, recon-
16 stituted nuclear weapons.” March 16, 2003,
17 NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice Presi-
18 dent Cheney.

19 (2) Preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq
20 the Vice President was fully informed that no legiti-
21 mate evidence existed of weapons of mass destruc-
22 tion in Iraq. The Vice President pressured the intel-
23 ligence community to change their findings to enable
24 the deception of the citizens and Congress of the
25 United States.




1 (A) Vice President Cheney and his Chief of
2 Staff, Lewis Libby, made multiple trips to the
3 CIA in 2002 to question analysts studying
4 Iraq's weapons programs and alleged links to al
5 Qaeda, creating an environment in which ana-
6 lysts felt they were being pressured to make
7 their assessments fit with the Bush administra-
8 tion's policy objectives accounts.

9 (B) Vice President Cheney sought out
10 unverified and ultimately inaccurate raw intel-
11 ligence to prove his preconceived beliefs. This
12 strategy of cherry picking was employed to in-
13 fluence the interpretation of the intelligence.

14 (3) The Vice President's actions corrupted or
15 attempted to corrupt the 2002 National Intelligence
16 Estimate, an intelligence document issued on Octo-
17 ber 1, 2002 and carefully considered by Congress
18 prior to the October 10, 2002 vote to authorize the
19 use of force. The Vice President's actions prevented
20 the necessary reconciliation of facts for the National
21 Intelligence Estimate which resulted in a high num-
22 ber of dissenting opinions from technical experts in
23 two Federal agencies.

24 (A) The State Department's Bureau of In-
25 telligence and Research dissenting view in the



1 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
2 stated “Lacking persuasive evidence that Bagh-
3 dad has launched a coherent effort to reconsti-
4 tute it’s nuclear weapons program INR is un-
5 willing to speculate that such an effort began
6 soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to
7 project a timeline for the completion of activi-
8 ties it does not now see happening. As a result
9 INR is unable to predict that Iraq could ac-
10 quire a nuclear device or weapon.”.

11 (B) The State Department’s Bureau of In-
12 telligence and Research dissenting view in the
13 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
14 also stated that “Finally, the claims of Iraqi
15 pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in
16 INR’s assessment, highly dubious.”.

17 (C) The State Department’s Bureau of In-
18 telligence and Research dissenting view in the
19 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
20 references a Department of Energy opinion by
21 stating that “INR accepts the judgment of
22 technical experts at the US Department of En-
23 ergy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes
24 Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use
25 in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium en-



1 dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability,
2 preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
3 United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty
4 to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, purposely
5 manipulated the intelligence process to deceive the citizens
6 and Congress of the United States about an alleged rela-
7 tionship between Iraq and al Qaeda in order to justify the
8 use of the United States Armed Forces against the nation
9 of Iraq in a manner damaging to our national security
10 interests, to wit:

11 (1) Despite all evidence to the contrary, the
12 Vice President actively and systematically sought to
13 deceive the citizens and the Congress of the United
14 States about an alleged relationship between Iraq
15 and al Qaeda:

16 (A) “His regime has had high-level con-
17 tacts with Al Qaeda going back a decade and
18 has provided training to Al Qaeda terrorists.”
19 December 2, 2002, Speech of Vice President
20 Cheney at the Air National Guard Senior Lead-
21 ership Conference.

22 (B) “His regime aids and protects terror-
23 ists, including members of Al Qaeda. He could
24 decide secretly to provide weapons of mass de-
25 struction to terrorists for use against us.” Jan-



1 uary 30, 2003, Speech of Vice President Che-
2 ney to 30th Political Action Conference in Ar-
3 rlington, Virginia.

4 (C) “We know he’s out trying once again
5 to produce nuclear weapons and we know that
6 he has a long-standing relationship with various
7 terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda organi-
8 zation.” March 16, 2003, NBC Meet the Press
9 interview with Vice President Cheney.

10 (D) “We learned more and more that there
11 was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda
12 that stretched back through most of the decade
13 of the ’90s, that it involved training, for exam-
14 ple, on biological weapons and chemical weap-
15 ons...” September 14, 2003, NBC Meet the
16 Press interview with Vice President Cheney.

17 (E) “Al Qaeda had a base of operation
18 there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran
19 a large poisons factory for attacks against Eu-
20 ropeans and U.S. forces.” October 3, 2003,
21 Speech of Vice President Cheney at Bush-Che-
22 ney ’04 Fundraiser in Iowa.

23 (F) “He also had an established relation-
24 ship with Al Qaeda providing training to Al
25 Qaeda members in areas of poisons, gases, and



1 conventional bombs.” October 10, 2003, Speech
2 of Vice President Cheney to the Heritage Foun-
3 dation.


4 (G) “Al Qaeda and the Iraqi intelligence
5 services have worked together on a number of
6 occasions.” January 9, 2004, Rocky Mountain
7 News interview with Vice President Cheney.

8 (H) “I think there’s overwhelming evidence
9 that there was a connection between Al Qaeda
10 and the Iraqi government” January 22, 2004,
11 NPR: Morning Edition interview with Vice
12 President Cheney.

13 (I) “First of all, on the question of—of
14 whether or not there was any kind of relation-
15 ship, there clearly was a relationship. It’s been
16 testified to; the evidence is overwhelming.”
17 June 17, 2004, CNBC: Capital Report inter-
18 view with Vice President Cheney.

19 (2) Preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq
20 the Vice President was fully informed that no cred-
21 ible evidence existed of a working relationship be-
22 tween Iraq and al Qaeda, a fact articulated in sev-
23 eral official documents, including:

24 (A) A classified Presidential Daily Briefing
25 ten days after the September 11, 2001 attacks



1 indicating that the United States intelligence
2 community had no evidence linking Saddam
3 Hussein to the September 11th attacks and
4 that there was “scant credible evidence that
5 Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with
6 Al Qaeda.’

7 (B) Defense Intelligence Terrorism Sum-
8 mary No. 044-02, issued in February 2002 by
9 the United States Defense Intelligence Agency,
10 which challenged the credibility of information
11 gleaned from captured al Qaeda leader al-Libi.
12 The DIA report also cast significant doubt on
13 the possibility of a Saddam Hussein-al-Qaeda
14 conspiracy: “Saddam’s regime is intensely sec-
15 ular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary move-
16 ments. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to pro-
17 vide assistance to a group it cannot control.”.

18 (C) A January 2003 British intelligence
19 classified report on Iraq that concluded that
20 “there are no current links between the Iraqi
21 regime and the al-Qaeda network”.

22 The Vice President subverted the national security
23 interests of the United States by setting the stage for the
24 loss of more than 3300 United States service members;
25 the loss of 650,000 Iraqi citizens since the United States



1 with the United States proven capability to carry out such
2 threats, thus undermining the national security of the
3 United States, to wit:

4 (1) Despite no evidence that Iran has the inten-
5 tion or the capability of attacking the United States
6 and despite the turmoil created by United States in-
7 vasion of Iraq, the Vice President has openly threat-
8 ened aggression against Iran as evidenced by the fol-
9 lowing:

10 (A) “For our part, the United States is
11 keeping all options on the table in addressing
12 the irresponsible conduct of the regime. And we
13 join other nations in sending that regime a
14 clear message: We will not allow Iran to have
15 a nuclear weapon.” March 7, 2006, Speech of
16 Vice President Cheney to American Israel Pub-
17 lic Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference.

18 (B) “But we’ve also made it clear that all
19 options are on the table.” January 24, 2007,
20 CNN Situation Room interview with Vice Presi-
21 dent Cheney.

22 (C) “When we—as the President did, for
23 example, recently—deploy another aircraft car-
24 rier task force to the Gulf, that sends a very
25 strong signal to everybody in the region that




1 the United States is here to stay, that we clear-
2 ly have significant capabilities, and that we are
3 working with friends and allies as well as the
4 international organizations to deal with the Ira-
5 nian threat.” January 29, 2007, Newsweek
6 interview with Vice President Cheney.

7 (D) “But I’ve also made the point and the
8 President has made the point that all options
9 are still on the table.” February 24, 2007, Vice
10 President Cheney at Press Briefing with Aus-
11 tralian Prime Minister in Sydney, Australia.

12 (2) The Vice President, who repeatedly and
13 falsely claimed to have had specific, detailed knowl-
14 edge of Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction
15 capabilities, is no doubt fully aware of evidence that
16 demonstrates Iran poses no real threat to the United
17 States as evidenced by the following:

18 (A) “I know that what we see in Iran right
19 now is not the industrial capacity you can [use
20 to develop a] bomb.” Mohamed ElBaradei, Di-
21 rector General of International Atomic Energy
22 Agency, February 19, 2007.

23 (B) Iran indicated its “full readiness and
24 willingness to negotiate on the modality for the
25 resolution of the outstanding issues with the




1 IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing
2 with the issues in the framework of the Agency,
3 without the interference of the United Nations
4 Security Council”. IAEA Board Report, Feb-
5 ruary 22, 2007.

6 (C) “...so whatever they have, what we
7 have seen today, is not the kind of capacity that
8 would enable them to make bombs.” Mohamed
9 El Baradei, Director General of International
10 Atomic Energy Agency, February 19, 2007.

11 (3) The Vice President is fully aware of the ac-
12 tions taken by the United States towards Iran that
13 are further destabilizing the world as evidenced by
14 the following:

15 (A) The United States has refused to en-
16 gage in meaningful diplomatic relations with
17 Iran since 2002, rebuffing both bilateral and
18 multilateral offers to dialogue.

19 (B) The United States is currently en-
20 gaged in a military buildup in the Middle East
21 that includes the increased presence of the
22 United States Navy in the waters near Iran,
23 significant United States Armed Forces in two
24 nations neighboring to Iran, and the installa-
25 tion of anti-missile technology in the region.



1 (C) News accounts have indicated that
2 military planners have considered the B61-11, a
3 tactical nuclear weapon, as one of the options
4 to strike underground bunkers in Iran.

5 (D) The United States has been linked to
6 anti-Iranian organizations that are attempting
7 to destabilize the Iranian government, in par-
8 ticular the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), even
9 though the state department has branded it a
10 terrorist organization.

11 (E) News accounts indicate that United
12 States troops have been ordered into Iran to
13 collect data and establish contact with anti-gov-
14 ernment groups.

15 (4) In the last three years the Vice President
16 has repeatedly threatened Iran. However, the Vice
17 President is legally bound by the U.S Constitution's
18 adherence to international law that prohibits threats
19 of use of force.

20 (A) Article VI of the United States Con-
21 stitution states, "This Constitution, and the
22 Laws of the United States which shall be made
23 in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
24 which shall be made, under the Authority of the
25 United States, shall be the supreme Law of the



1 Land.” Any provision of an international treaty
2 ratified by the United States becomes the law
3 of the United States.

4 (B) The United States is a signatory to
5 the United Nations Charter, a treaty among the
6 nations of the world. Article II, Section 4 of the
7 United Nations Charter states, “All Members
8 shall refrain in their international relations
9 from the threat or use of force against the ter-
10 ritorial integrity or political independence of
11 any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
12 with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The
13 threat of force is illegal.

14 (C) Article 51 lays out the only exception,
15 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
16 the inherent right of individual or collective
17 self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
18 Member of the United Nations, until the Secu-
19 rity Council has taken measures necessary to
20 maintain international peace and security.”
21 Iran has not attacked the United States; there-
22 fore any threat against Iran by the United
23 States is illegal.

24 The Vice President’s deception upon the citizens and
25 Congress of the United States that enabled the failed



1 United States invasion of Iraq forcibly altered the rules
2 of diplomacy such that the Vice President's recent bellig-
3 erent actions towards Iran are destabilizing and counter-
4 productive to the national security of the United States.

5 In all of this, Vice President Richard B. Cheney has
6 acted in a manner contrary to his trust as Vice President,
7 and subversive of constitutional government, to the preju-
8 dice of the cause of law and justice and the manifest injury
9 of the people of the United States.

10 Wherefore Richard B. Cheney, by such conduct, war-
11 rants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

